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ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM IN THE WAKE OF YAMAHA
MOTOR CORP., USA V. CALHOUN: IS YAMAHA A CRY BY
THE JUDICIARY FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN STATE
TERRITORIAL WATERS?
On July 6, 1989, tragedy and sorrow beset the waters near
Humanco, Puerto Rico.1 Natalie Calhoun and her family were
vacationing in Puerto Rico with family friends at the Palmas Del
Mar Resort.2 On that ill-fated afternoon, twelve-year-old Natalie
Calhoun rented a Yamaha "WaveJammer" and set out on a ride
over the ocean waters.' Tragically, the ride did not go as
planned and was cut short when Natalie's WaveJammer
slammed into the side of an anchored vessel in the waters off of
a hotel frontage.4 The crash resulted in Natalie's death.5 Weeks
later, Natalie's parents, Lucien and Robin Calhoun, brought a
suit against Yamaha in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and prayed for relief consistent with the Pennsylvania wrongful
death and survival statutes.6
In response to the Calhouns' claim, Yamaha moved for a par-
tial summary judgment arguing that the Supreme Court, in
1. See Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996), modified,
40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa. 1999). This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Yamaha, particularly with reference to the decision's impact on uniformity in
maritime law. While this Note was in publication, the case was remanded to the
District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for consideration of the issue
of whether state law or federal law should govern the substantive rights of the par-
ties. In an opinion by Judge Pollak, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the district
court held that state law should govern the rights of parties in wrongful death ac-
tions relating to nonseamen killed in state territorial waters. See id. at 295. The
consequence of this decision is a diminished role for uniformity in maritime law
because the decision will create numerous standards of liability as a result of the
variations in state wrongful death statutes. This Note takes the position that the
district court erred in opening the floodgates to further inroads on the place of uni-
formity in maritime law.
2. See id.; Steven F. Friedell, Searching for a Compass: Federal and State Law
Making Authority in Admiralty, 57 LA. L. REV. 825, 825 (1997).
3. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 202.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8301-8302 (West 1998); Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 202.
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Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,7 created a general mari-
time law wrongful death remedy that excluded the application of
all state remedies for wrongful deaths of nonseamen occurring
within territorial waters.8 The Supreme Court rejected Yamaha's
reasoning and held that the state law remedies were available to
the Calhouns.9 This decision touched off a rigorous debate and
turned one family's tragedy into a maze of conflicting doctrines
and interests.
Since the decision, courts have grappled with Yamaha in an
attempt to balance the federal desire for uniformity in admiral-
ty'0 with the proliferation of applicable state law remedies."
This debate over federalism, though exacerbated in Yamaha, is
by no means new to maritime law.' The discrepancy between
the supremacy of federal law and the protection of local interests
is rooted deeply in maritime law.'" The debate has been acute,
7. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
8. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 209-10.
9. See id. at 209-16.
10. The terms "admiralty" and "maritime" are equivalent terms and will be used
interchangeably throughout this Note. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 47 (6th ed.
1990).
11. See, e.g., In re Amtrak, 121 F.3d 1421, 1424-28 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the analysis in Yamaha and the traditional notions of uniformity in maritime law in
reaching the conclusion that federal law governed the liability standards whereas
state law provided only a remedial measure); American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81
F.3d 127, 130-31 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Yamaha for the conclusion that nonpecuni-
ary damages could be recovered pursuant to Florida state law); Calhoun v. Yamaha
Motor Corp., USA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-94 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (recognizing a desire
to "harmonize" various aspects of maritime law); Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,
675 So. 2d 879, 884-86 (Ala. 1996) (applying Yamaha to hold that a nondependent
could recover for loss of society and punitive damages under state law); Brateli v.
United States, 1996 AMC 1980, 1982-85 (D. Alaska) (construing Yamaha to allow
federal law to apply where more liberal than state law and awarding nonpecuniary
damages for nondependent beneficiaries in wrongful death cases); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Polackwich, 677 So. 2d 880, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that
under Yamaha state remedies governed federal maritime wrongful death actions in-
volving nonseamen in territorial waters).
12. Compare Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953) (holding
that general maritime law governed to the exclusion of state law in personal injury
actions occurring within state territorial waters), with The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358
U.S. 588, 592-94 (1958) (holding that the wrongful death statute of the state of New
Jersey governed both the standard of care and the remedies available in wrongful
death actions occurring within state territorial waters).
13. See, e.g., Friedell, supra note 2, at 825 (discussing the traditional conflict be-
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particularly in the context of maritime wrongful death cases.
Over the years, the courts have acknowledged that states have
interests with respect to tortious actions culminating in death
within their territorial waters.14 These interests include (1) the
establishment of general rights and duties of persons and prop-
erty within state boundaries, 5 (2) the police power to prevent
pauperism and dependency on the state by survivors, 16 and (3)
the control over "certain local regulations of a maritime na-
ture."'7 These state interests are counterbalanced by federal
interests, such as (1) the protection of commerce, 18 (2) the main-
tenance of uniformity, 9 and (3) the supremacy of federal legisla-
tion.2"
Though all of these interests are important judicial consider-
ations, the potential erosion of uniformity in admiralty draws
the most attention in the aftermath of Yamaha. Uniformity has
always been a hallmark of maritime law;2' however, Yamaha
tween state and federal interests particularly in light of the decision in Yamaha). In
his article, Professor Friedell describes the tension that is at the core of the Court's
decision and argues that the Court "prefers to defer to the states when the state
interest is strong." Id& at 845. Although Friedell correctly concludes that judges are
left in a tenuous balancing situation and that given their choice they would prefer
to be guided by a statute, the analysis ends there. See id. at 841, 844, 852-53. The
analysis does not answer how state remedies are to be resolved in lieu of statutory
authority or describe what a comprehensive wrongful death statute should look like.
See id. at 853 ("[T]he courts are going to encounter uncertainty as they attempt to
balance the needs of the states and the needs of the federal government. Uncertain-
ty may be the price we need to pay."). This Note attempts to reach beyond the
analysis provided in Friedell's article and answer the question of "what now?".
14. See City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
15. See id.
16. See Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Norwalk, 55 F. at 108.
17. Norwalk, 55 F. at 108; see also In re Amtrak, 121 F.3d 1421, 1426 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing Brockington v. Certified Elec., Inc., 903 F.2d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir.
1990), which recognized that states have an interest in regulating local matters
without the interference of the federal government).
18. See 1 STEVEN F. FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 105, at,7-10 to 7-11
(1999).
19. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
20. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (holding
that the statutory remedies in the Death on the High Seas Act governed to the
exclusion of general maritime law).
21. See, e.g., Jensen, 244 U.S. at 214-17 (using interference with uniformity as a
standard against which state regulation should be reviewed).
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has led a number of commentators2 2 and at least one court23 to
undermine the necessity of uniformity as a guiding principle.
Questioning the principle of a uniform maritime law is problem-
atic for it implicates the following possibilities: a state statute of
limitations supplanting the federal statute of limitations, a state
right to a jury trial being enforced in federal court, and state
theories of negligence applying in federal actions.' Therefore, it
22. See Friedell, supra note 2, at 845 (arguing that "[t]he protection of maritime
commerce through uniform national laws is not what it used to be ... Yamaha sig-
nals that... a fundamental rearrangement of federal and state relations in the
maritime field may be underway"); Charles S. Haight, Jr., Babel Afloat: Some Reflec-
tions on Uniformity in Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 189, 202 (1997); John
Krimmel, The Availability of State Causes of Action for the Wrongful Death of
Nonseamen Killed in Territorial Waters: Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1013, 1026 (1997) ("Thus the Supreme Coures opinion in Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Calhoun represents a denial of the importance of uniformity concerns in
maritime law .... "); Robert D. Peltz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21
TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 103 (1996); Andrew L. Krueger, Note, A New Course for Admi-
ralty Uniformity: Yamaha v. Calhoun and Maritime Wrongful Death, 16 ST. LoUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 149, 174 (1996). Each of these articles suggests that the decision in
Yamaha undermines uniformity as the baseline principle in admiralty jurisprudence.
23. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (holding
that state law governs the rights of nonseamen killed in territorial waters). The
ramification of this holding is that there now may be as many as fifty different
standards of liability, i.e., one per state, thus effectively destroying the place of uni-
formity in this area of maritime law. This Note stands in stark opposition to this
conclusion. The following analysis suggests that not only does Yamaha leave unifor-
mity in place, it actually expands uniformity's role as a factor in the balancing of
state and federal interests to determine which remedial law applies in state territo-
rial waters.
24. For a more comprehensive listing of the possible conflicts that the full-scale
application of state law in the maritime context would create, see Walter Johnson,
Diving into the Wreck: An Exploration of Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 9 U.S.F.
MAR L.J. 141, 158-62 (1996); cf. Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 294 ("Mr. Johnson
builds his case for this doctrinal resurrection [of The Tungus] on the Supreme
Court's Yamaha opinion but the evidence... is somewhat ambiguous. More com-
pelling evidence is to be found in the Court of Appeals' Yamaha opinion.") (footnote
omitted). Although properly rebutting the tenuous arguments posited by Mr. John-
son, see Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 294 n.7; infra notes 107-61, the recent opinion
of Judge Pollak incredulously fails to give any consideration to the ramifications of
applying state law to wrongful death actions of nonseamen in territorial waters.
Compare Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 293-95 (failing to mention how the application
of a state substantive liability standard will impact other aspects of maritime law),
with Johnson, supra, at 158-62 (listing numerous areas of maritime law that are
confused by a wholesale application of state law in the maritime wrongful death
context).
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is necessary to wrestle with the plausible intentions of the
Court's opinion and what they mean for the future of admiralty
law.
The following pages survey the expansion of wrongful death
remedies in admiralty jurisprudence, including the effect of the
augmentation of state remedies on the principles of uniformity
and federalism. The first section of this Note discusses the histo-
ry of wrongful death and briefly describes some of the unique
features of admiralty jurisprudence.25 The focus then shifts to
the decision in Yamaha and its implications for the future of
admiralty law.26 The second section examines the Yamaha deci-
sion, with the analysis centering on the seemingly expansive
role of state law by focusing on whether the treatment of feder-
alism issues in Yamaha resuscitates the holding in The Tungus
v. Skovgaard" This question is resolved in the negative through
two alternative theories. First, the analysis illustrates that The
Tungus never approved of the expansive role for state law that
was and is so often erroneously attributed to its holding.28 Alter-
natively, this Note argues that the Court in Yamaha did not es-
pouse the use of state law for anything more than a supplemen-
tal remedial measure in wrongful death actions.29
The third section discusses the difficulties encountered, partic-
ularly by the trial judge, when state law plays too great a role in
25. See infra notes 37-97 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
27. 358 U.S. 588 (1958). The Tungus is discussed in detail below, see infra text
accompanying notes 107-32; however, a brief word may be helpful at this point. The
Tungus suggested the primacy of state law as the basis of a standard of liability in
admiralty wrongful death cases. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 152-57. The case
arose from the death of Carl Skovgaard, a maintenance foreman who was assisting
efforts to repair a faulty oil pump used to pump hot coconut oil from the ship to on-
shore tanks. See The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 589. While attempting to walk through a
part of the vessel where oil had yet to be removed, Skovgaard slipped and fell to
his death in a vat of hot oil. See id. The Court, in determining that state law gov-
erned in toto, see id. at 592, proclaimed that "[i]t would be an anomaly to hold that
a State may create a right of action for death, but that it may not determine the
circumstances under which that right exists," id. at 594. This language appears to
suggest that the Court favored the use of state law not just for its remedial value,
but also as the measure of when liability would and would not attach. See infra text
accompanying notes 107-11.
28. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
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maritime wrongful death actions. This section features a case
study of the statutes of limitation in maritime actions.3 0 This
case study exemplifies one of the numerous abnormalities created
when state law is applied as anything more than a supplement
to federal law in the area of remedies."' Contrary to the asser-
tions of some commentators,32 the fourth section of this Note
concludes that Yamaha was a delicately reasoned decision that
attempted to maintain uniformity in the standard of liability
while properly balancing competing interests pertaining to appli-
cable remedies. Ultimately, Yamaha represents an appeal to
Congress to develop a comprehensive statute applicable to
nonseamen in territorial waters that is similar to the statutes
governing seamen3 and the high seas beyond the boundaries of
United States territorial waters.3' This law should be similar to
and consistent with the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)"5
and the Jones Act; 6 should preempt state remedies only when a
federal remedy is in marked contrast to it; and should reaffirm
the dominance of federal statutory authority in the maritime
context.
THE HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH AT SEA
A thorough exploration of the law with respect to wrongful
death actions is necessary in order to understand the impact of
Yamaha on the state of admiralty law in territorial waters.
30. See infra notes 133-74 and accompanying text. The reader will quickly recog-
nize that the discussion contained in this section refers to case law that is common
to any student of civil procedure. This simplicity is intended as a means of high-
lighting that even the most deeply rooted and easily identifiable principles of Ameri-
can jurisprudence are confused by a misinterpretation of the role of state law in the
maritime wrongful death context.
31. The case study is emblematic of only a single anomaly created by a misread-
ing of Yamaha and is by no means to be taken as exhaustive.
32. See supra note 22.
33. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994) (granting seamen and the personal represen-
tatives of seamen the same remedies available for railway employees in personal
injury and wrongful death).
34. See id. at app. §§ 761-767 (granting a wrongful death remedy for the personal
representative of the decedent when death occurs more than one marine league from
the coast).
35. Id.
36. Id. at app. § 688.
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Admittedly, trying to pin down any conclusions with respect to
the dangling questions in admiralty is an inexact science at
best." Nevertheless, an investigation into the Yamaha Court's
intent is critical given the far-reaching effects of the decision on
lawyers, judges, commercial ship owners, and state legislators.
Introduction to Maritime Law I
To understand the history of maritime wrongful death actions,
a brief survey of maritime law is necessary. Since the founding
of the United States, maritime legal actions have been the prov-
ince of the federal courts.8 Although the Framers did not ex-
press any particular rationale behind the decision to create a
federal admiralty jurisdiction,39 evidence exists that they grant-
ed dominion to the federal judiciary to insure the protection of
maritime commerce for the young nation." The separation of
admiralty jurisdiction from the common law resulted in a num-
ber of distinctive maritime rules, including trials by a judge with
no recourse to a jury,41 actions based on a maritime lien in
rem,42 and liability apportioned on the basis of comparative fault
as opposed to contributory fault.'
37. Even the Court has expressed its confusion with respect to this area of law,
noting that "[olur precedent does not precisely delineate . . . 'it would be idle to
pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is
readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence.. . .'" Yamaha Motor Corp., USA
v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 452 (1994)), modified, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994).
39. See Friedell, supra note 2, at 828 ("The idea was born that the purpose for
admiralty jurisdiction was to have a court with expertise in commercial shipping in
order to further the federal interests in the regulation of an industry vital to na-
tional interest."); Krueger, supra note 23, at 150 n.7 (noting that in Farand's tran-
scripts of the Convention there was little reasoning for the grant of admiralty juris-
diction).
40. See 1 FRIEDELL, supra note 18, § 105.
41. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 35
(2d ed. 1975).
42. See id. at 36.
43. See THOMAiS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 3-4, at 110-11
(2d ed. 1994). The list of distinctive maritime features is too long to enumerate in
this Note. It suffices to state, however, that the distinctiveness of maritime law
creates a variety of opportunities for forum shopping and other legal strategizing. A
comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the maritime legal landscape is beyond
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In addition to these distinctive rules, maritime law also bears
a unique standard of liability; not only does it provide for liability
based on negligence," it also allows for a remedy based on the
owner's failure to provide a seaworthy vessel.45 This cause of
action centers on the duty of a vessel owner or operator to exer-
cise due diligence to ensure that his vessel is seaworthy.46 Over
time the general maritime law recognized that the duty to pro-
vide a seaworthy vessel is nondelegable.47 Furthermore, it is
well-recognized that the duty is absolute and that liability can
be assessed independent of negligence.4" In practice, in order to
"state a cause of action for unseaworthiness a plaintiff must
allege his injury was caused by a defective condition of the ship,
its equipment or appurtenances."49 The test for unseaworthiness
is "whether the vessel, equipment or appurtenances were 'rea-
sonably fit for their intended use." Once this evidence is estab-
lished, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and will
prevail in the absence of evidence showing that the appliances
and machinery were reasonably fit for their intended usage.51
The application of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to the mari-
time law of wrongful death actions is discussed at length below.
Pre-Yamaha Cases
The early cases involving maritime wrongful death actions ex-
cluded the application of state statutes;52 however, the outcomes
of wrongful death cases began to change as states began to
the scope of this Note.
44. See id. § 3-2, at 99-105.
45. See id. § 3-9, at 143.
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); Hobart v.
Sohio Petroleum Co., 445 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1971); Ballwanz v. Isthmian Lines, Inc.,
319 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1963).
48. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 43, § 3-9, at 143.
49. Id. at 275.
50. Charamie v. Garland, No. 86-5540, 1989 WL 133098, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 19,
1989) (quoting Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960)).
51. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 43, § 4-25, at 277.
52. This result occurred because in the early years of the nation there was no
statutory or common law right recognized by the courts in either the general mari-
time law or under any applicable state laws. See Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S.
522, 524 (1872).
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adopt their own wrongful death acts.53 In The Harrisburg,54 the
Court faced the difficult questions of whether federal law al-
lowed an action for wrongful death in the absence of any stat-
utory authority, and if not, whether the law allowed an action
under the law of the state.55 The case involved a claim of wrong-
ful death brought by the widow of Silas Rickards, who died
when his vessel, the Harrisburg, collided with a schooner, the
Marietta Tilton, in Massachusetts's navigable waters." The dis-
trict court ruled in favor of Rickards's widow, holding that the
general maritime law governed negligence actions in navigable
waters and that the state statute of limitations did not bar such
actions because the actions were federal.5" The Supreme Court
reversed the district court and held that no general federal mari-
time action existed and that only statutorily codified maritime
wrongful death actions would succeed.5" The Court, however,
declined to address the question of whether the state wrongful
death statute applied and, instead, found that the state statute
of limitations barred the potential claim.59 Thus, The Harrisburg
concluded with the harsh result that wrongful death actions
could not be brought under the general maritime law, but with
uncertainty as to whether state statutory laws could provide a
remedy.
In the period following The Harrisburg, general maritime law
and statutory provisions attempted to alleviate the intractable
result of the earlier decision. In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,60 the
Court allowed wrongful death actions to be brought under appli-
53. See id. at 532-34; see also Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S.
398, 406-07 (1907) (holding that a Delaware statute granted a remedy for tortious
conduct occurring on the high seas).
54. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
55. See id. at 204.
56. See id. at 199.
57. See id. at 201-02.
58. See id. at 213-14.
59. See id. at 214.
60. 257 U.S. 233 (1921). Garcia involved a claim for wrongful death by the widow
of Manuel Souza, a California citizen, who was killed due to negligent hoisting of
coal onto a vessel anchored in the San Francisco Bay. See id. at 238-39. Although
the court recognized that an action could be maintained under state wrongful death
statutes, the California statute of limitations barred the action. See id. at 242-43.
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cable state statutes.61 Likewise, on the statutory front, Congress
in 1920, passed DOHSA, which granted a right of action
"[whenever the death of a person [is] caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore."" That same year Congress provided,
through the passage of the Jones Act, a federal maritime wrong-
ful death remedy for seamen regardless of where the injury took
place.63 In summary, after 1921, all seamen had a remedy under
the Jones Act regardless of the location of the injury, all persons
had a remedy under DOHSA if injured on the high seas,' and
all persons whose state laws provided a remedy could assert a
remedy in territorial waters under Garcia.
This system worked effectively until the Supreme Court trans-
formed unseaworthiness into a strict liability doctrine.65 Once
the doctrine of unseaworthiness could not be countered with a
defense of due diligence,66 unseaworthiness became a claim of
strict liability and not a claim based on negligence." Against
this historical context, the Court fashioned a remedy in the gen-
eral maritime law for wrongful death actions in Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.68
Moragne involved unseaworthiness and negligence actions
brought under Florida's wrongful death and survival statutes by
the widow of a longshore worker killed in the territorial waters
of Florida.69 The Florida statute, however, did not include a
provision for recovery based on unseaworthiness. ° After a dis-
missal of this portion of the claim in the district court and an
61. See id. at 242.
62. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1994). A marine league is defined as approximately
three miles in distance from the shore. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 967 (6th ed.
i990).
63. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688.
64. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
65. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 399 (1970); supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
66. See Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 544-46 (1960); Seas Ship-
ping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946); Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.,
321 U.S. 96, 100 (1944).
67. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
68. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
69. See id. at 376.
70. See id. at 376-77.
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affirmation in the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider which remedies were available under fed-
eral maritime law.7
In deciding Moragne, the Court noted three anomalies created
by the strict liability remedy afforded through unseaworthi-
ness.7 2 First, the Moragne decision recognized a disparity in the
availability to bring an unseaworthiness action based on the na-
ture of the underlying cause of action. The Court noted that
strict liability unseaworthiness was available in personal injury
actions,7 but that some states, such as Florida, had not included
unseaworthiness in their wrongful death statutes.7 As a result,
the availability of an unseaworthiness claim wavered based on
the gravity of the injury such that "identical conduct violating
federal law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) pro-
duces liability if the victim is merely injured, but frequently not
if he is killed."7 5 The Court's opinion thus sought to harmonize
the causes of action available in personal injury actions with
those available in wrongful death actions. 6 Second, the Court
emphasized the anomolous results produced by the territorial
restrictions inherent in DOHSA.7 7 Under DOHSA, the unseawor-
thiness of a vessel that resulted in the death of a nonseamen
produced a valid wrongful death claim 8 provided the event
causing the fatality occurred beyond a three mile distance from
the shore. 9 If the event causing death occurred within three
miles of the shore, however, DOHSA would not apply, and thus
there would be no liability for unseaworthiness, unless the state
statute governing the locality provided unseaworthiness as a
basis of liability.80 In response to this issue, the Court's decision
sought to synthesize the causes of action available in territorial
and nonterritorial waters. 81 Third, the Court noted a discrepancy
71. See id. at 377.
72. See id. at 395-96.
73. See id. at 395.
74. See id. at 376.
75. Id. at 395.
76. See id.
77. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
78. See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958).
79. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
80. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395.
81. "Territorial" is used to refer to the area of water within three miles of the
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in the availability of an unseaworthiness claim based on the
victim's occupation. Because state law governed claims by or
relating to longshore workers, these workers were able to bring
an unseaworthiness claim provided the laws of the state allowed
unseaworthiness claims. 2 On the other hand, those deemed to
be seamen under the provisions of the Jones Act 3 were excluded
from pursuing unseaworthiness claims.84
Armed with the recognition of these inconsistencies in unsea-
worthiness actions, the Court constructed a general maritime
law remedy of unseaworthiness that supplemented all other
remedies and applied to all persons regardless of their status or
where the injury took place.85 In so doing, the Court overruled
the holding in The Harrisburg that no remedy for wrongful
death existed in the general maritime law. 6 Moragne rejected
the defendants' argument that DOHSA manifested a congressional
intent to leave the remedies available for wrongful death solely
within the purview of state laws." Moragne, therefore, effectively
filled the gap left by the statutes and the courts' inconsistent
applications of the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
With the overruling of The Harrisburg and the creation of a
federal maritime wrongful death action, it appeared that federal
law was the paramount authority in all maritime wrongful
death actions.8 This assessment rested on the premise that the
shore; "nonterritorial" refers to the area beyond three miles of the shore.
82. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395.
83. For an excellent discussion of who is defined as a seaman, see Chandris, Inc.
v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347 (1995); SCHOENBAUM, supra note 43, § 4-9, at 198-218.
84. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395 (recognizing that the Jones Act does not provide
a remedy for unseaworthiness, but does so for negligence). Thus, by its silence, the
Jones Act was seen to have precluded the unseaworthiness cause of action. See gen-
erally Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964) (reaffirming that a
negligence action under the Jones Act is the exclusive action for wrongful death).
85. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 407-09 (discussing the overruling of The Harrisburg,
which allowed for the provision of a remedy in the general maritime law).
86. See id. at 409.
87. See id. at 397-98. States Marine Lines argued that because DOHSA did not
extend its scope to within a marine league of the shore, and expressly reserved this
area for state law to govern, it manifested Congress's desire that only state law
would govern in territorial waters. See id. at 397-98. In response, the Court noted
that there was no need to fashion a remedy under DOHSA for territorial waters
because such remedies would be available already under state laws. See id. at 398.
88. See, e.g., Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (2d
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Jones Act would continue to provide the remedy for all seamen,
both inside and outside of territorial waters. 9 Likewise, DOHSA
would provide the same sort of remedy for nonseamen on the
high seas, and Moragne would allow the general maritime law to
fashion the remedy for nonseamen within territorial waters.9"
Coupled with this understanding was the concept that "the Su-
preme Court's creation in Moragne of a federal wrongful death
action under general maritime law precludes the use of state
wrongful death statutes in maritime claims.""
Cir. 1993) (holding that "federal maritime law, whether or not it conflicts with state
law, applies to actions for wrongful death in state territorial waters ...").
89. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1994); supra notes 33-34, 64 and accompanying text.
90. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 43, § 6-3, at 412-15 (explaining the
evolution of the general maritime law).
91. Wahlstrom, 4 F.3d at 1089; see also Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 985 (5th
Cir. 1989) (noting, without citation, that Moragne recognized actions for both unsea-
worthiness and negligence); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that the need for uniformity requires extension of Moragne to negli-
gence claims); Garner v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., 768 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.W.
Va. 1991) (highlighting that the crucial issue in Moragne was determining which
damages are recoverable in a wrongful death action); Neil v. McGinnis Inc., 716 F.
Supp. 996, 1000 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (highlighting that the crucial issue in Moragne was
determining which damages are recoverable in a wrongful death action). But see
Ford v. Wooten, 681 F.2d 712, 715 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that Moragne "per-
tained only to an unseaworthiness claim"); Minnick v. United States, 767 F. Supp.
115, 118-19 (E.D. Va. 1990) (noting that "Moragne created a general maritime death
cause of action for unseaworthiness" but not for negligence).
The position taken by the courts that Moragne provided only a remedy for un-
seaworthiness appears inconsistent with the holding of Moragne for three reasons.
First, Moragne provided that "an action does lie under general maritime law for
death caused by violation of maritime duties." Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409. Both negli-
gence and unseaworthiness qualify as maritime duties. Therefore, because Moragne
made no express determination as to whether the maritime duty referred to was un-
seaworthiness or negligence, it is speculative to state that Moragne only applies to
unseaworthiness. This position is consistent with the fact that Moragne referred to
maritime duties as opposed to a single duty of unseaworthiness.
Second, viewing Moragne to create a remedy for both unseaworthiness and neg-
ligence accords with the policy announced in Moragne that "it better becomes the
humane and liberal character of the proceedings in admiralty to give than to with-
hold the remedy..... "Id. at 387 (quoting The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C. Md.
1859) (No. 12,578)).
Third, the Court in Yamaha noted that the 1972 amendments to the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1927), effec-
tively overruled the extension to longshore workers of the duty of seaworthiness. See
Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 208 n.6 (1996). Moragne in-
volved the extension of the duty of unseaworthiness to a longshore worker. See
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The Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Sea-Land Services, Inc.
v. Gaudet92 confirmed the sweeping view of Moragne. Gaudet
involved a claim by the widow of a longshoreman, fatally injured
on the job, for loss of support, loss of society and services, and
funeral expenses.93 The Court allowed the relief prayed for un-
der the general maritime law remedy established in Moragne,
thus effectively determining that Moragne was more than a
mere gap-filling measure.94 Gaudet's expansion further solidified
the notion that the general maritime law remedy fashioned in
Moragne held sway in territorial waters, even to the exclusion of
any state statutory remedies.
A number of judicial decisions have since limited to territorial
waters the general maritime law remedy created in Moragne
and expanded in Gaudet. The Court arrived at these limits
through its decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham.95
Higginbotham involved an action for nonpecuniary damages by
survivors of a Mobil employee who died in a work-related heli-
copter crash.96 The Court held that because the exclusive reme-
dies provided for in DOHSA governed, DOHSA displaced any
other general maritime law remedies.97  Thus, after
Higginbotham, the presence of a statutory remedial regime pre-
cluded the far-reaching remedies called for under the general
maritime law action in Moragne. Ultimately, this meant that the
expansive remedial aspects of Gaudet were applicable only in
actions involving the wrongful death of nonseamen in territorial
waters because the Jones Act or DOHSA governed all other
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376. If the footnote in Yamaha is correct in finding that the
1972 amendments to LHWCA overruled the extension of unseaworthiness to
longshore workers, then by implication, the amendments would also overrule
Moragne. Yamaha does not express such a view, but instead relies heavily on
Moragne to reach its conclusion. Therefore, it does not appear plausible that the
Supreme Court in Yamaha read Moragne to grant anything less than a remedy for
both negligence and unseaworthiness.
92. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
93. See id. at 573.
94. See id. at 584 (holding that "under the maritime wrongful-death remedy, the
decedent's dependents may recover damages for their loss of support, services, and
society, as well as funeral expenses" (emphasis added)).
95. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
96. See id. at 619.
97. See id. at 620-26.
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actions. It was from the midst of this historical framework that
the Court in Yamaha rendered its decision.
SkAMAHA ANALYSIS
After the death of their daughter off the coast of Puerto Rico,
Natalie Calhoun's parents brought an action in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania against Yamaha alleging negligence,
strict liability, and breach of implied warranties.9" The Calhouns
sought various remedies consonant with the Pennsylvania state
wrongful death and survival statutes, including lost future earn-
ings, loss of society, loss of support and services, and funeral ex-
penses.9 In response, Yamaha moved for partial summary judg-
ment contending that Moragne excluded all remedies except for
the payment of funeral expenses under the general maritime
law."°° The district court agreed with Yamaha that the general
maritime law governed, and that Moragne displaced Pennsylva-
nia laws."0 1 As a result, the court granted summary judgment
with respect to lost future earnings, but found that loss of soci-
ety, loss of support and services, and funeral expenses were
available to the Calhouns under maritime law."°2
Following the district court's decision, both parties appealed to
the Third Circuit, which held that state law governed the ques-
tion of which law applied to remedies, 03 but expressly refused to
address the question of which liability standard, governed.'O°
98. See Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 202 (1996).
99. See id.; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
100. See id. at 203; supra note 7 and accompanying text.
101. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F.3d 622, 625 (3d Cir. 1994),
affd, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 644 ("We have concluded that whether loss of society, loss of sup-
port and services, future earnings, or punitive damages are available for the death
of a non-seamen in territorial waters is a question to be decided in accordance with
state law.").
104. See id. ("We do not, however, reach the question of which state's
law-Pennsylvania's or Puerto Rico's-applies."). The conclusion is a step back from
the earlier language of the opinion in which the court intimated that state law gov-
erned not only the remedial measures available, but also the liability standards to
be applied. The court stated that "we hold that the appropriate rule of decision in
this area should be supplied by state law" and that "[iun the absence of a clear
conflict, state law rules of decision should apply." Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
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Yamaha appealed this decision to the United States Supreme
Court, which affirmed the Third Circuit's decision and held that
"the damages available for the jet ski death of Natalie Calhoun
are properly governed by state law."105 Like its predecessor in
decision, the Court indicated in a footnote its desire to limit the
holding to the remedies available to the exclusion of the stan-
dards of liability. 106 Thus, the vexing question of which law gov-
erned liability in actions concerning the death of nonseamen in
territorial waters seemed to remain wholly unresolved by the
Court.
In the thick of this confusion a number of scholars have sug-
gested that the decision in Yamaha resurrected the Court's hold-
ing in The Tungus. 7 The Tungus involved a .wrongful death
action brought by the widow of a maintenance foreman who fell
to his death in an eight-foot-deep pool of coconut oil while as-
sisting in repair work on a broken pump.'08 The Court, in a 5-4
decision, held that New Jersey law should govern the action.0 9
The majority found that "'[t]he liability and the remedy are cre-
ated by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy
are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right.""0 Thus,
105. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 216 n.14. The Court noted that the liability standard created a per-
plexing anomaly by recognizing that personal injury cases historically have been
decided under federal law liability standards while state liability standards have
governed wrongful death actions. See id.; see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (recognizing that the same wrongful action, providing an
unseaworthy vessel, always resulted in liability if the victim was injured but not
necessarily if the victim died).
107. Many scholars examining the decision in Yamaha have suggested that the
Court's reassertion of state law in the context of territorial waters opens up the
prior decision in The Tungus, which was believed to have been extinguished when
The Harrisburg was overruled. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 24, at 157 ("Moragne
did expressly overturn The Harrisburg, which seemed to most courts to render The
Tungus irrelevant. With Calhoun we see that The Tungus is not irrelevant at all,
and we must now consider how The Tungus, along with Calhoun, will affect the law
of maritime wrongful death and survival."). But see supra note 24 (describing the
ambiguity inherent in Johnson's arguments).
108. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 589 (1959); supra note 27.
109. See id. at 594.
110. Id. at 592 (quoting The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886)). But see The
Tungus, 358 U.S. at 601 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal law should
control, with the state remedy to serve in the federal court as a supplement)..
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the holding of The Tungus provides that when even a portion of
state law is used to reconcile an issue in the maritime context,
"[ift is incumbent upon a court enforcing that policy to enforce it
all; it may not pick or choose.""' The decision in Yamaha leads
to the question, as Walter Johnson has identified, of whether
Yamaha actually reinvigorates The Tungus's use of state law in
toto.11
Before examining how Yamaha affects the vitality of the hold-
ing in The Tungus, it is important to examine precisely what the
Justices in The Tungus actually sought to achieve. On its face,
The Tungus appears to suggest that when any portion of state
law is applicable, the whole of state law is also applicable.1 3 The
wholesale application of state substantive law, to include the
standard of care, drew a vigorous dissent by the other four mem-
bers of the Court." The dissatisfaction expressed by the dissent
grew stronger in the case of Goett v. Union Carbide Corp."' in
which Justice Whittaker, a member of the majority in The
Tungus, stated:
The Court's opinion says that The Tungus v. Skovgaard...
"decided that it was a question of state law as to what is the
proper substantive law to be applied to maritime torts within
the territorial jurisdiction of the States in wrongful death
cases [and that] [ulnder this holding, in a maritime tort death
case, the State might apply the substantive law generally
applicable to wrongful death cases within its territory, or it
might choose to incorporate the general maritime law's con-
cepts of unseaworthiness or negligence." I do not understand
the Tungus case to so hold, and if such a holding was intend-
ed by its author or by any of the Justices who joined it, it
does not say so. 1
16
111. The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 593. The Court's language in this case was an un-
equivocal assertion that in the wrongful death context, state law must apply in toto.
But cf Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (recognizing that in the
personal injury context state law may only supplement federal law). The Court in
Hawn rejected a contributory negligence defense based on state law as inconsistent
with federal personal injury law. See id. at 409-10.
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
114. See The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 594.
115. 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
116. Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added).
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Justice Whittaker went on to articulate a new understanding
of what The Tungus meant by arguing that "[i]t seems to me
that the substantive legal rights and liabilities involved, are to
be measured by the standards of the general maritime law...
as remedially supplemented by the [state] statute."117 Therefore,
it is not altogether certain-and it is probably unlikely-that
The Tungus stands for the proposition that state law must gov-
ern in toto when it applies. Nevertheless, for the purpose of
argument, this discussion assumes the validity of the more liberal
reading of The Tungus.
The Conventional Understanding of The Tungus and Its
Impotency Under the Yamaha Framework
The wholesale application of state law in The Tungus was
rooted in the Court's rejection of any form of a general common
law with respect to maritime wrongful death in The Harrisburg
and its progeny." 8 The absence of a common law cause of action
solidified the role of state wrongful death statutes such as the
one at issue in The Tungus."9 This view changed, however,
when Moragne provided a general federal common law wrongful
death action, obviating the need for a statutory claim based on
state law. 2 ° With Moragne's overruling of The Harrisburg, the
strength of The Tungus appeared to be undercut. 2'
117. Id. at 346. Justice Whittaker, however, found himself in the minority in Goett
because the Brennan wing, who had dissented in The Tungus, concurred in Goett
solely under the compulsion of the precedent of The Tungus. See id. at 343.
118. The holding of The Harrisburg, which concluded that no action for wrongful
death was available under federal law, led many federal courts to allow claims
brought under state wrongful death statutes. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U.S. 233, 242-44 (1921) (noting that a claim brought under the California stat-
ute would be allowed in federal court if it met the California statute of limitations
which it did not). Because there was no corresponding right of action for these cases
in federal law, see The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886), there was no corre-
sponding issue of whether allowing state statutes to apply undercut the principle of
uniformity by conflicting with federal law, for there simply was no federal law. Not
until the Court's decision in Moragne was there any kind of federal law or decision
applicable to wrongful death actions involving nonseamen in territorial waters.
119. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
120. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970).
121. See Friedell, supra note 2, at 836 ("If The Tungus 'rests' on The Harrisburg, and
is its corollary, then with the overruling of The Harrisburg, the latter case is left hanging
[Vol. 41:677694
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A deeper look into a number of factors found in Yamaha sug-
gests that The Tungus remains relegated to the lack of vitality
that Moragne cast upon it. 122 One rationale posited to support
the continued potency of The Tungus is the fact that Moragne
itself did not expressly overrule The 'Tungus.' However, the
Yamaha Court asserted in a footnote that the only reason The
Tungus survived being overruled in Moragne was the Court's
hope in Moragne to provide an unseaworthiness remedy for all
seafarers, which a simple overruling of The Tungus would not
furnish.' Because the Court in Moragne was able to reach its
end without having to overrule The Tungus, the decision exem-
plified proper judicial restraint. 5
in mid-air.").
122. This is not to suggest that The Tungus is devoid of all precedential value. See
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F.3d 622, 641 n.39 (3d Cir. 1994), affd,
516 U.S. 199 (1996). The Third Circuit's opinion in Calhoun recognized that Moragne
only overruled The Harrisburg, but left The Tungus intact, see id., thus opening the
door for the court to conclude that The Tungus retains vitality. This opinion, howev-
er, fails to delineate the breadth of this vitality that appears, from the evidence, to
be constrained to the question of what law governs the remedies available to wrong-
ful deaths of nonseamen in territorial waters. Compare Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8 (avoiding a determination as to the continued vitali-
ty of The Tungus's application of state law in its entirety), and supra notes 113-17
(arguing that the majority of The Tungus Court never really intended the broad role
for state law that is so often attributed to the holding in The Tungus), with
Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(holding that the Supreme Court's holding in Yamaha resurrected the in toto ap-
plication of state law originally'recognized in The Tungus).
123. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375.
124.
The Court might have simply overruled The Tungus .... [b]ut training
Moragne solely on The Tungus would have left untouched the survivors
of seamen, who remain blocked by the Jones Act from pursuing state
wrongful death claims ... . Thus, nothing short of a federal maritime
right of action for wrongful-death could have achieved uniform access by
seafarers to the unseaworthiness doctrine, the Court's driving concern in
Moragne.
Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 213 n.10.
125. Of course, basic principles of stare decisis prohibit courts from casually over-
ruling their decisions. In addition, the Court may have foreseen the need to keep
intact the holding of The Tungus in determining what remedies are available to
successful plaintiffs in wrongful death claims involving nonseamen killed in terri-
torial waters. See supra text accompanying note 123; infra note 129 and accompany-
ing text.
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Other aspects of the Court's rationale in Yamaha are more
dispositive of the fact that The Tungus is to remain in the weak-
ened state rendered by Moragne. First, the decision avoided any
consideration of what standard of liability should apply. 26 It is
particularly informative that the Court, while affirming the
Third Circuit's decision, refused to adopt the appeals court's
language suggesting that state law should govern the standard
of liability.2 7 Likewise, the decision in Yamaha in no way at-
tempted to overrule Moragne's expansion of remedies.'28 There-
fore, if one accepts the argument that Moragne undercut The
Tungus, the Yamaha decision cannot be said to weaken
Moragne's effect. Additionally, Yamaha interpreted Moragne as
limiting the general maritime law remedy to rights of action in
unseaworthiness that are not provided by statutory or general
maritime law.'29 In a similar fashion, The Tungus allowed state
statutory law to apply because there was no federal statutory or
general maritime law right of action for unseaworthiness under
The Harrisburg.3 ° Thus, the Court in Yamaha recognized that
the Moragne decision finally addressed the very problem that
The Tungus inadequately sought to remedy.13 Yamaha's inter-
126. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. The Court, in footnote 14 of its
decision, ensures that the holding is not to extend beyond the scope of remedies. See
Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 n.14.
127. Compare Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8 ("We ... confine our inquiry to the
modest question whether it was Moragne's design to terminate recourse to state
remedies when nonseafarers meet death in territorial waters."), with Calhoun v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F.3d 622, 625 (1994) ("[Tlhe appropriate rule of deci-
sion in this area should be supplied by state law.").
128. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 213.
129. See id. at 214 (quoting from the Third Circuit's decision in Calhoun, which
stated that the "humane and liberal" purpose sought by the Moragne decision was
driven by the view that the survivors of seamen killed in territorial waters should
not be barred from bringing certain claims simply because there was no state or
federal statutory remedy).
130. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 590-91 (1959).
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. By recognizing the possibility that
Moragne simply could have overruled The Tungus, the Court essentially framed
Moragne to bring finality to the same problems addressed in The Tungus and
Moragne. Cf. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 & n.7
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (rejecting Johnson's arguments in favor of a reinvigorated role for
The Tungus, but arguing that The Tungus retains vitality using the reasoning of the
Third Circuit in its initial consideration of Calhoun). In analyzing the question of
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pretation of Moragne and The Tungus lent credence to the un-
derstanding that Moragne undercut the foundation on which The
Tungus rests."2 Accordingly, the opinion in Yamaha provides no
conclusive evidence to support the conjecture that Yamaha res-
urrected The Tungus.
A Case Study in the Incongruity that Application of The Tungus
Would Now Produce: The Statute of Limitations
Background
Examining the law relating to the statute of limitations re-
veals a further indication of the incongruity produced by inter-
preting Yamaha to apply state law in toto. According to the
holding of The Tungus, a federal court applying state law must
apply all of the accompanying limitations of state law. 33 This
application of state law thus includes the use of the state statute
of limitations.'3 The situation, however, is complicated further
because a federal maritime statute of limitations now governs
all actions invoking admiralty jurisdiction.'35
Initially the doctrine of laches governed the statute of limita-
tions in admiralty. 13 1 Under this doctrine, federal courts used
state statutes of limitations as a supplement to the use of state
wrongful death actions.3 7 This understanding governed until the
which substantive liability standard-state or federal-should apply, the district
court pointed out that both the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court deferred on
this question. See Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 290-91; see also Yamaha, 516 U.S. at
216 n.14 ("The Court of Appeals also left open, as do we, the source-federal or
state-of the standards governing liability, as distinguished from the rules on reme-
dies."). The district court then inexplicably cited the Third Circuit's opinion as au-
thority for the proposition that state law should control the substantive liability
standard. See Calhoun, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (citing Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 641 n.39).
132. See Friedell, supra note 2, at 834-36.
133. See The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 592-93.
134. See, e.g., Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
135. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a (1994) ("Unless otherwise specified by law, a suit
for recovery of damages for personal injury or death, or both, arising out of a mari-
time tort, shall not be maintained unless commenced within three years from the
date the cause of action accrued.").
136. See SCHOENBAIM, supra note 43, § 3-22, at 178.
137. See, e.g., Western Fuel, 257 U.S. at 233, 243; The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199,
214 (1886).
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adoption of the federal statute of limitations in 1980, which
applied to all suits "arising out of a maritime tort." 8'
A brief description of admiralty jurisdiction is necessary to
understand in which cases the federal statute of limitations
applies. Admiralty jurisdiction is the exclusive province of the
federal district courts;" 9 however, the very provision that gives
this jurisdiction to the federal courts reserves some suits to the
state courts by the "savings to suitors" clause. 140 Amidst this
somewhat confusing provision, the courts have developed a two-
part test for the application of maritime jurisdiction. The first
part, known as the "locality" or "situs" test, asks whether the
action took effect in or on navigable waters." The second part,
known as the "nexus" test, requires that the action bear a signif-
icant relation to traditional maritime activities.' Traditionally,
courts have been very lenient in allowing parties to qualify for
maritime jurisdiction under the two-part test.'3
The Pre-Yamaha Understanding
An examination of the pre-Yamaha understanding of the stat-
ute of limitations begins with the leading case of Butler v. Amer-
ican Trawler Co.' Butler sued the company as a result of an
injured finger she sustained while trying to board the Sea Lion
VII, a docked fishing boat owned by American." 5 American ar-
gued for summary judgment on the ground that Butler had not
filed her claim within the applicable federal statute." Butler
replied that she had not brought her claim to federal court on
the basis of admiralty jurisdiction, but instead that her claim
involved state law and reached federal court only on the basis of
138. 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a.
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994).
140. See id. § 1333(1).
141. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
142. See Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 361-67 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982).
143. See, e.g., Richardson, 457 U.S. at 674-75 (rejecting petitioner's argument that
a substantial relationship with commercial maritime activity was essential to invoke
federal maritime jurisdiction).
144. 707 F. Supp. 29 (D. Me. 1989).
145. See id. at 30.
146. See id. at 30-31.
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diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.147 Thus, she argued the more
generous six year Maine statute of limitations should apply.14
The court, however, found that the plaintiff's claim fell within
the maritime jurisdiction and that in all claims "sounding in
maritime tort law, federal admiralty law controls when substan-
tive provisions of federal admiralty and state law conflict."149
Having determined that the claim fell within the ambit of mari-
time jurisdiction, the court turned to the issue of whether a
statute of limitations constituted substantive law for choice of
law purposes.15 The court resolved this question in the affir-
mative by drawing on the decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York. 5' for the proposition that because a statute of limitations
bears a strong potential impact on the final outcome of a cause
of action it constitutes substantive law. 52 Therefore, applying
the "reverse-Erie" doctrine, 5 ' the court concluded that because
the statute of limitations was substantive, the federal statute of
limitations, as codified in 46 U.S.C. § 763a, governed to the ex-
clusion of the state statute and thus, Butler's claim was time-
barred.'54
147. See id. at 31.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 32. Courts and scholars alike have referred to this principle as the
"reverse-Erie" doctrine. See Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 223 (1986)
(arguing that in admiralty, choice of law questions are decided in precisely the oppo-
site manner as that prescribed by the decision in Erie); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). Unlike Erie, which prescribed the use of state substantive law in
federal courts whenever state and federal law conflicted, see Erie, 304 U.S. at 78,
the reverse-Erie doctrine required state or federal courts dealing with admiralty
issues to apply federal law whenever the state and federal laws came into conflict
with one another. See Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 223.
150. See Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 33.
151. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
152. See Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 34. The court in Butler analogized the Supreme
Court's use of the "outcome determinative" test in York, see York, 326 U.S. at 109,
to the situation before it to conclude that in admiralty, as well as in other contexts,
a statute of limitations is a substantive law rule, see Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 34.
The court also relied on the later civil procedure decisions of the Supreme Court in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), and Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), to support its decision. See infra notes 162-73 and
accompanying text.
153. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
154. See Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 35.
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In addition to Butler, other pre-Yamaha decisions expressed
the principle that when maritime jurisdiction is available, de-
spite how the plaintiff casts the claim, the federal statute of
limitations governs.'55 Likewise, these cases reflect traditional
concerns of uniformity in admiralty law. 156 As a result, prior to
Yamaha, the courts applied the federal statute of limitations in
any case in which maritime jurisdiction was available due to
uniformity concerns.
If, as the argument goes, Yamaha is read to eliminate the
principle of uniformity in admiralty by resurrecting The Tungus
to allow a wholesale application of state law, then the applica-
tion of state statutes of limitation should also become more
widespread after Yamaha. The Court indicated a preference for
the supremacy of federal statutory law, 157 but made no direct
mention of which statute of limitations should apply.
An examination of the post-Yamaha cases interpreting the
choice of which statute of limitations to use reveals no substan-
tial change in the policy favoring the federal statute. In White v.
Mercury Marine,'58 the Eleventh Circuit read Yamaha to hold that
state law was only applicable in "the absence of congressional
action in the area."' 59 Following this understanding of Yamaha,
155. See, e.g., Coleman v. Slade Towing Co., 759 F. Supp. 1209, 1212 (S.D. Miss.
1991).
156. For example, in Anderson v. Varco International, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 26 (Tex.
App. 1995), the court noted:
Supplementing federal admiralty law with the Texas two-year statute of
limitations is inconsistent with traditional admiralty law. A two-year
statute of limitations affects the harmony and uniformity of maritime
law, thus altering the substantive maritime law.... The federal three-
year statute of limitations preempts the Texas two-year statute of limita-
tions in maritime tort actions to preserve the uniformity sought by 46
U.S.C. App. § 763a.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
157. See Yamaha Motor Corp. USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215-16 (1996) (noting
that when Congress has acted to apply a statute uniformly, the Court will not add
to or otherwise change the statutory construction of the Congress), modified, 40 F.
Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
158. 129 F.3d 1428 (11th Cir. 1997).
159. Id. at 1431; see also Alderman v. Pacific N. Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 1061, 1065-66
(11th Cir. 1996) (holding that an action that comes under the jurisdiction of admiral-
ty is bound to apply the federal substantive law, which includes the statute of limi-
tations); Ford v. Atkinson Dredging Co., 474 S.E.2d. 652, 653-54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
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the court held that it "cannot use Florida law to supplement the
general maritime statute of limitations in this or any other
case."6 ° The unmistakable language of White highlights the
principal anomaly of reading Yamaha to prescribe a wholesale
application of state law; in order to do so, courts must preempt
federal statutory law, a course that even Yamaha refused to
countenance.16
A Simplistic Understanding of Why Yamaha Cannot Be Said
to Invigorate State Law In Toto
Perhaps the clearest guide as to how to interpret Yamaha can
be found by returning to the analysis of the court in Butler.
Throughout the course of its decision, the Butler court made
reference to the choice of law decisions found in York, Byrd, and
Hanna.'62 The Butler decision, along with the corresponding
"reverse-Erie" doctrine,"6 illustrates the permissibility of draw-
ing analogies in the admiralty context to civil procedure deci-
(holding that a Georgia tolling statute was inapplicable because Yamaha would allow
the application of state law only when there was no applicable federal statute). But
see Johnson v. Walsh, 41 Va. Cir. 314, 315-16 (Cir. Ct. 1997) (rejecting the su-
premacy of the federal maritime statute of limitations in favor of using the two-year
Virginia statute of limitations). The court in Johnson rested its decision not on
Yamaha but on an earlier reading of Moragne by the Virginia Supreme Court which
held that Moragne created only a federal remedy in actions of unseaworthiness and
not in actions allegedly caused by negligence. See Brown v. Brown, 309 S.E.2d 586
(Va. 1983). Ultimately, a reluctant court in Johnson found that because there was
no general maritime law remedy for wrongful death under Moragne, there was no
federal cause of action to which the federal statute could apply. See Johnson, 41 Va.
Cir. at 315. In essence, the decision in Johnson should be seen less as a choice of
the state statute of limitations over the federal statute, but rather as a supplemen-
tal measure where a federal statute is inapplicable. This position is analogous to the
decision regarding remedies in Yamaha. However, numerous decisions indicate that
the reading of Moragne in Johnson and Brown is a minority view. Many cases indi-
cate that Moragne created a general maritime law wrongful death remedy. See, e.g.,
Cantore v. Blue Lagoon Water Sports, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Fla. 1992);
Garner v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., 768 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.W. Va. 1991); Neil v.
McGinnis Inc., 716 F. Supp. 996 (E.D. Ky. 1989); Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,
675 So. 2d 879 (Ala. 1996).
160. White, 129 F.3d at 1432 (emphasis added).
161. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
162. See Butler v. American Trawler Co., 707 F. Supp. 29, 33-35 (D. Me. 1989).
163. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
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sions. With this framework in mind, any analysis of the Yamaha
decision would be remiss to ignore the seminal decisions in York,
Byrd, and Hanna.
The York decision turned on whether the statute of limita-
tions is a substantive or a procedural rule.' 4 In determining
that the statute of limitations amounted to a substantive deter-
mination, the Court applied the "outcome determinative" test,'
which provides that the disputed issue is considered substantive
if its "application would vitally affect the.., cause of action."'
Applying the "outcome-determinative" test to the facts of
Yamaha demonstrates that Yamaha extends the application of
state law as a supplement to remedies, and not as a standard of
liability. If Yamaha were understood as extending state law to
provide the basis of liability, the outcome of two identical cases
could vary based on which state's laws applied. 6 ' Nevertheless,
simply extending state law to provide a supplementary remedial
option has no effect upon the outcome of the case itself, but only
upon the accompanying consequences of that outcome. There-
fore, the application of the York "outcome-determinative" test
supports the proposition that Yamaha's extension of state law be
limited to remedies alone.
164. See Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 34. The distinction was vitally important to the
determination of which law applied in York because of the earlier Supreme Court
decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that sub-
stantive state law and federal procedural laws govern in conflict of law actions in
federal courts. See id. at 78. It is important to note that in the admiralty context
this choice of law distinction reaches precisely the opposite result with federal sub-
stantive law governing to the exclusion of state substantive law under the "reverse-
Erie" doctrine of maritime law. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. The
argument then follows that York is to Erie what Butler is to Tallentire. For just as
York used the "outcome determinative" test to distinguish between a procedural and
a substantive rule as a precursor to the application of the Erie doctrine, see Guaran-
ty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), so too, Butler uses the York outcome
determinative test as a precursor to the application of the "reverse-Erie" doctrine, see
Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 34.
165. See York, 326 U.S. at 109.
166. Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 34.
167. Furthermore, this result is undesirable given the underlying premises of
Moragne. One of the catalysts for the Court's action in Moragne was the fact that a
liability claim was available in one territorial area that was not available outside
that territorial area. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395
(1970).
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In addition to relying on York, the Butler court examined the
analysis in Byrd. 68 Specifically, the Byrd decision supplemented
the "outcome-determinative" test with a test that balanced the
competing state and federal interests in having their own provi-
sion apply.169 Applying this balancing test to the facts of
Yamaha, it is evident that the federal interest in uniformity
outweighs the state's interest in applying its law in toto. The
state has a compelling interest in protecting the rights of its
citizens, particularly within their own territorial waters. This
interest, however, must be balanced against the federal interest
in providing a measure of predictability for commercial interests
through a uniform federal law.'70 More importantly, efficiency is
served by having a less complicated standard of liability to ap-
ply. If state law were to apply in toto, conceivably judges could
be forced to apply fifty different state laws.'7' In this regard, ap-
plication of the Byrd test would favor the expansion of state law
only to the extent needed to provide supplemental remedies.
The final case invoked in Butler was Hanna,'72 in which the
Court held that choice of law "cannot be read without reference
to the dual aims of the Erie rule: the discouragement of forum
shopping and the avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws."'73 There is no doubt that, if state law were to apply in
toto under the Yamaha holding, some state laws would be more
generous than others. There is also no doubt that forum shop-
ping will result when conflicting state law standards are avail-
able."74 If state law is limited only to remedies, however, these
168. See Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 34-35.
169. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
170. Weighing heavily on the side of the federal interest is the evidence that the
protection of commercial interests was the principal reason for the constitutional
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts. See supra notes 18, 40 and ac-
companying text; infra note 193 and accompanying text.
171. On the other hand, applying state law only as a supplement to remedies
strikes a compromise between the state interests and the federal interests. By allow-
ing state residents to apply their home state's remedial laws, the home state would
retain some measure of protection over their own citizens. At the same time, this
understanding of Yamaha would allow for one standard of liability, the federal stan-
dard, to govern the seas.
172. See Butler, 707 F. Supp. at 35.
173. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
174. This argument is particularly damaging to the opinion of the district court on
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dangers are reduced considerably because the claimant would
have to prove the general uniform standard of liability before
reaping the benefits of the more generous state law. Likewise,
extending state law in toto would result in an inequitable ad-
ministration of laws because some state laws would be more
stringent than others. In this situation, two claimants who are
injured under the same circumstances could have different re-
sults based on where they reside. The Court rejected such a
result in Hanna, thus providing further support for the limited
application of state law under Yamaha.
DECONSTRUCTING YAMAHA
It is tenuous at best to argue that the opinion in Yamaha
revived The Tungus and asserted a new role for state law in the
admiralty context.175 The remaining question then is if Yamaha
is not meant to allow the wholesale application of state law, for
what is Yamaha calling? A host of recent decisions by lower
courts have produced numerous interpretations of Yamaha.
From these decisions, several generalities can be gleaned regard-
ing the impact Yamaha is likely to have on admiralty jurispru-
dence. One important result is the expansion of remedies avail-
able in maritime tort actions.7 6 Another noteworthy effect of
Yamaha, according to these cases, is the reaffirmance of the
remand in Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa.
1999), because the court altogether failed to consider the ramifications of its holding
on forum shopping. See id. at 293-95.
175. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. It is of paramount importance
to note that even at the time the decision in The Tungus was rendered, it was
thinly assented to with three other Justices joining in Justice Brennan's vigorous
dissent. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 597-612 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (noting criticisms of
the view that "The Tungus stands for the proposition that state law must govern in
toto when it applies").
176. See American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that when an accident occurs in territorial waters and does not involve seamen or
longshore workers, maritime law does not displace state wrongful death and survival
statutes that allow for the recovery of nonpecuniary damages); Brateli v. United
States, 1996 AMC 1986, 1984-85 (D. Alaska) (holding that although Yamaha makes
available state remedies in maritime, it cannot be read to restrict the recovery to
state law where the federal remedies are more generous).
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preeminence of federal statutory law when in conflict with state
laws.177
Foremost among the indicators of Yamaha's significance, how-
ever, is the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in In re Amtrak.7 8
In Amtrak, the court placed two severe limitations on the hold-
ing in Yamaha. First, Amtrak found that Yamaha was inapplica-
ble in the personal injury context because the law of admiralty
had for years provided a remedy for personal injuries.' 79 Second,
the court read Yamaha extremely narrowly and suggested that
Yamaha applies only when the state remedial measures do not
conflict with federal maritime law or substantive admiralty
law. 8 ' Furthermore, the court noted that "it is equally certain
that the Yamaha Court, while aware that its decision would
create, to some extent, unavoidable conflict between state law
and federal maritime law, did not intend to sacrifice wholly
long-standing admiralty principles at the altar of states'
rights."'' Applying this language to the questions at hand, the
post-Yamaha case law appears to confirm the conclusion that
Yamaha is not to be read to advance the wholesale application
of state law in maritime decisions.
At this point, the skeptic may suggest that if the Court had
truly intended state law to apply only with respect to remedies,
it would have stated as much."2 Instead, the Court clearly
stopped short.l8  This is the view taken by those who believe
that the decision in Yamaha spelled the end of uniformity in
177. See, e.g., American Dredging, 81 F.3d at 130 (holding that Yamaha made clear
that federal law preempts state law when the claimant is a seaman or longshore-
man); Brateli, 1996 AMC at 1984 (holding that a federal statute that specifies the
appropriate relief in maritime wrongful death cases would preempt state law); Choat
v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 675 So. 2d 879, 885-86 (Ala. 1996) (holding that federal
law would preempt state law if the claimant were a seaman).
178. 121 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1997).
179. See id. at 1428-29.
180. See id. at 1426.
181. Id. at 1424. The court based its view on the conclusion that the Court in
Yamaha limited its own holding to a strictly remedial measure. See id.
182. The same argument, of course, is applicable to the view that state law applies
in tote.
183. See Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 216 n.14 (1996)
(leaving open the question of whether federal or state law governs the standard of
liability), modified, 40 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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admiralty law.l" In fact, the decision in Yamaha takes great
pains to reconcile its holding with the principles set forth in
Jensen and Moragne, both of which support uniformity.'85 The
Court simply refused to reaffirm the traditional understanding
of Moragne. This constraint arose from the Court's reading of
section 7 of DOHSA, which "stops DOHSA from displacing state
law in territorial waters."'86 Accordingly, if the Court upheld the
traditional view of Moragne, it would have created a nonuniform
situation in which state law would be displaced in navigable
waters, but not in nonnavigable waters.8 7
In this respect, the Court stood in the most unwelcome posi-
tion of facing a situation in which upholding the traditional view
of Moragne would undermine the very vitality of Moragne. As-
suming its reading of Moragne is correct, the Court was correct
in attempting to reconcile the different federal maritime regimes
rather than providing a final decision on the ultimate role of
state law. In so doing, the Court preserved uniformity between
territorial and nonterritorial waters and left the question of the
applicability of state law in territorial waters to the legislative
branch.
THE AFTERMATH OF YAMAHA
The Yamaha holding is best understood by a consideration of
the relevant balancing factors that influenced the Court's
decision.' The best understanding of the current state of the
law is that the determination of which law applies to wrongful
death actions in state territorial waters requires a balancing of
state and federal interests.189 This is the best understanding
184. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
185. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 211-14.
186. Id. at 216.
187. This was one of the three incongruities that the court sought to rectify in Moragne.
See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395-96 (1970).
188. Viewing federalism with an eye toward balancing is consistent with the ap-
proach accepted by many before Yamaha, see, e.g., DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY
AND FEDERALISM 236 (1970), as well as the approach accepted by courts after
Yamaha, see, e.g., In re Amtrak, 121 F.3d 1421, 1425-26 (11th Cir. 1997) (recogniz-
ing the need to balance Alabama's interests against the federal interest to determine
which law applies).
189. See Amtrak, 121 F.3d at 1425.
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because it explains the anomalous result reached by the Court
in Yamaha and the subsequent rejection of that ultimate conclu-
sion by the Eleventh Circuit in Amtrak.90 The distinction be-
tween these cases is that a products liability case involving a
twelve-year-old 91 does not have the same potential effect on
commerce as a train derailment caused by a vessel colliding with
a bridge.'92 Consequently, the juxtaposition of these two deci-
sions indicates that Yamaha should be read to accommodate
judicial balancing.
At this point, one must ask whether judicial balancing is con-
ducive to the goals of admiralty law. The protection of commerce
and the necessity of uniformity in this protection is at the heart
of admiralty. 9 s The primacy of a balancing test renders judicial
determinations susceptible to varying factual patterns, and
breeds uncertainty in the law. These effects certainly could not
represent the intention of the Court in deciding Yamaha. A
better view sees Yamaha as reflecting a clear judicial reluctance
to settle the question of which law governs,194 while acknowl-
edging deference to congressional authority.' 95 These twin as-
pects of the Yamaha opinion resound the Court's subtle call for
legislative action. The language of Yamaha itself reveals a slight
disappointment in current maritime statutes. 96 Thus, Yamaha
represents a judicial cry for the legislature to step in and fore-
close the possibility of further inconsistent results.
As a practical matter, Yamaha provides some measure of
guidance as to what a new statute should look like. First, the
statute should expand, rather than contract, the remedies cur-
190. Compare Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 (holding that a wrongful death action of a
nonseamen in territorial waters is governed by state statute), with Amtrak, 121 F.3d
at 1426 (holding that Alabama's interest in applying its wrongful death statute did
not overcome the federal interest in having the general maritime law govern the
action).
191. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 202.
192. See Amtrak, 121 F.3d at 1422-23.
193. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
194. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8.
195. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
196. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 ("Taking into account what Congress sought to
achieve, we preserve the application of state statutes to deaths within territorial
waters." (emphasis added)).
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rently available in wrongful death.197 Second, any statute gov-
erning territorial waters should be compatible with DOHSA and
the Jones Act. 9 ' As is the case with both the Jones Act and
DOHSA, any act created to govern territorial waters should
govern to the exclusion of state laws. In order to be consistent
with Yamaha, however, the new statute should allow state rem-
edies to apply as a supplement to any statutory remedies. 99 Of
course, allowing recovery under state remedies could provide one
claimant a more generous remedy than a similarly situated
claimant. Nevertheless, this result is far more desirable than
having numerous standards of liability for wrongful death claims.
CONCLUSION
Those who suggest that the Yamaha decision eliminates uni-
formity and replaces it with the use of state law in toto misun-
derstand the underlying rationale of the case. To read Yamaha
in this manner runs counter to the general maritime law under-
standing of the statute of limitations as well as the bedrock
principles laid out in York, Byrd, and Hanna. Instead, what
Yamaha reveals is a need for Congress to balance the competing
federal and state interests in territorial waters. Yamaha reveals
a need to solidify uniformity by forcing the development of a
federal statutory remedy, rather than an intent to sound the
death knell of uniformity.
David R. Lapp
197. See id. at 213.
198. This uniformity is necessary to square with the concerns expressed in both
Moragne and Yamaha. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
199. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215-16 (favoring an expansive view of applicable
remedies in territorial waters based on the strong state interests that are present).
In Jones Act or DOHSA claims, however, the state interests that are present must
yield to the supremacy of the federal statutes on point. See supra note 195 and accom-
panying text.
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